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Abstract  
Infrastructure forms an enduring and evolving system of services, assets, projects, and networks.  
This paper presents an overview of research into the misalignment between the strategic intent and 
the management of those systems.  The research draws from experiences across infrastructure 
sectors and countries to frame the problem, then uses central and local government transportation 
organisations from New Zealand to explore the problem in more detail. 
Although infrastructure does not often fail catastrophically, there is an inability to fully deliver 
appropriate and relevant infrastructure outcomes over the long term.  This paper presents the cross-
case analysis of three detailed studies which explored this issue through three different lenses by 
investigating three key lifecycle/organisational transitions at the system rather than at the project 
level.  The research has identified a pressing need for ‘system stewardship’ to address the increased 
specialisation and siloed operation within current practice.  This boundary spanning function/culture 
is needed to not only deliver ‘joined up thinking’, but also organisational learning, and the ongoing 
transformation of the complexed asset-service-organisational-contextual system in response to 
ongoing change.   
Key words:  system thinking, infrastructure, governance, management 
Introduction 
Although infrastructure does not often fail catastrophically during its design life, it also does not 
appear to be performing as well as it could be (e.g. Dobbs et al., 2013).  However, this is not just 
about project selection, investment and delivery; a matter that has received much attention within 
both research and in practice (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2009; OMEGA Centre, 2012).  Rather, a currently 
overlooked challenge is the integration of individual projects, assets, and service initiatives, into 
existing infrastructure systems so that their impacts, benefits, and contribution to the whole system 
can be recognised, understood, and managed.  So, even if questions of project delivery are fully 
addressed across all project stages prior to handover, there remains a wider systemic problem.  This 
relates to the operational ability to deliver intended outcomes; not just of the project, but of the 
underpinning systemic strategic intent that firstly defined that project.  It is this, less obvious 
underperformance that is the problem that interests this research.   
Accordingly, the problems of interest here do not relate to whether project-level initiatives are being 
delivered across project stages, nor is this a matter of project procurement.  Project-level matters, 
such as the follow-through of actions arising from environmental effects assessments, have already 
long been the subject of other investigations (e.g. Arts, Caldwell, & Morrison-Saunders, 2001; Blom, 
  
1997, 2000).  Rather, the point is that even if questions of project delivery are fully addressed across 
all project stages prior to handover, there remains a wider systemic problem.  This relates to the 
operational ability to deliver intended outcomes, not just of the project, but of the underpinning 
systemic strategic intent that firstly defined that project.  What is required is Systems Thinking for 
systems, not projects. 
So, while infrastructure rarely fails catastrophically, and may perform well in the short term or from 
a certain perspective, we need to address these problems of system level outcome delivery, which 
are insidious, complex, not widely articulated, and furthermore, less researched.  Without systemic 
research we cannot be sure of whether the problems are material, and are left with unconnected 
anecdotes that are of limited value in improving the delivery of infrastructure outcomes. 
However, the field of ‘whole-of-systems working’ is still emerging, and whilst now being advanced 
for public services such as health, there is little in the assets-as-service arena of the built public 
infrastructure sectors such as roads, rail, energy, and water.  What is required is Systems Thinking 
for systems, not projects.  Moreover, conventional, linear thinking is inadequate to deliver intended 
long-term infrastructure outcomes and a new paradigm is required; one that is both outwardly 
focused and system oriented.  We need a different ‘mental model’ from the project- and asset-
based conventions that dominate infrastructure practice at this time, and must address the question 
as to whether current infrastructure practice is capable of supporting system-level strategic intent.  
Operational functioning 
Jackson (2009) usefully contemplates Systems Thinking in relation to management and its place in 
contemporaneous operational research (terming this “applied systems thinking”).  Whilst three 
strands to this are identified by Jackson, and highlight the evolution of applied system thinking, of 
particular relevance to this research is the commentary on a fourth tranche: described as ‘recent 
developments’.  In this, Jackson identifies two systems approaches that have been “little discussed in 
the academic world but are having a considerable impact on practice” (emphasis added): 
'Whole Systems Working' has been influential in the field of health and social care.  It is 
described by Hudson (2006) as the process of involving all stakeholders of a domain in a 
discussion about service change—all parties are encouraged to think about the way the 
whole service delivery system works, rather than focusing only upon their own service. 
Vanguard's system thinking combines aspects of systems thinking, lean thinking and 
intervention theory to deliver, it claims (Seddon, 2003):  
  
A method for...achieving the ideals many managers aspire to: a learning, improving, 
innovative, adaptive and energized organization.  It provides the means to develop a 
customer-driven adaptive organization. 
This approach is getting significant take-up in the public sector, where it offers a damning 
critique of existing ways of doing things as well as numerous examples of a better way 
(Seddon, 2008). 
Both approaches provide an object lesson in how relatively simple (though not simplistic) 
combinations of systems ideas can have a huge impact on improving managerial practice 
and the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations (Jackson et al, 2008).  
Hudson’s work describes an approach for integrated working at the system level (Hudson, 2006).  
However, the aspiration of Hudson’s definition should not be construed as prerequisite criteria or a 
given method for approaching complex systems (i.e. it does not automatically stand that anything 
less than the involvement of all stakeholders cannot be classified as a whole system approach).  
Indeed, Hudson concludes that “a whole system approach does not offer a single technique or a new 
big answer”.  Supporting this, Hudson identifies four case studies; each of which uses a different 
method.  All four of the studies were in the health and social services, and paid “more than a passing 
conceptual nod to what a whole system approach is really about”.   
Hudson also notes that attempts to implement a whole system approach were “few and far 
between”.  This somewhat challenges Jackson’s assertion that the approach has been influential in 
practice, but this may be more symptomatic of Jackson’s observation that the area has attracted 
little in the way of academic discussion.     
Public sector administration 
Other germane literature includes the corpus which follows the development of ‘New Public 
Management’ in the public sector (which emphasises business-like performance management and 
stakeholder collaboration; Asquith (2016)).  However, infrastructure-related literature in this area is 
also sparse; Almklov and Antonsen (2014, p. 1) providing one of the few examples.  Significantly, 
they found that New Public Management “renders essential aspects of operational work invisible —
including practices that are known to be of importance for reliability”, particularly operational co-
ordination and the retention of operational history.  In this regard, Almklov and Antonsen observe 
that operational work has no clear beginning or end, and that this may be “hard to prescribe, 
describe, and control”.  They argue that this is at odds with the New Public Management model, and 
that there is very little research into the effects of New Public Management upon the practice of 
operating critical infrastructure. 
  
It also transpires that the academic literature says relatively little directly or specifically about the 
relationship between the strategic intent and the management of public infrastructure systems: 
Public service failure and turnaround are issues of pressing practical concern in most nations, 
yet theoretical and empirical research in this field is sparse.  (Boyne in Hartley, Donaldson, 
Skelcher, & Wallace, 2008, p. 249) 
The few studies that are available focus on the delivery of services and therefore do not penetrate 
the technical realm of engineering for and within Public Administration.  One of the inhibiting factors 
for any Public Administration research appears to be the very complexity of the systems in question, 
and how to meaningfully engage with this; despite fifty years of operational research, Jackson 
(2009), concludes this is still an emergent area.   
Infrastructure administration 
Much of the current built infrastructure literature examines issues through a project-centric lens 
which presupposes a conventional asset lifecycle of: plan–build–maintain–dispose (Figure 1).  
Implicit within this linear tradition is a presumption of delivering more projects, then optimising the 
maintenance and renewal of the hard assets.   
 
Figure 1:  Conventional infrastructure lifecycle 
Source:  Adapted from Blom and Guthrie (2017b) 
As there is an extensive body of literature aimed at improving (optimising) aspects of infrastructure 
management (e.g. project and asset management, strategy development, network function, benefit 
management, risk management), this research does not therefore include matters of project 
delivery.  Instead it focuses on the integration of projects into the wider infrastructure system.  This 
raises three points: 
 Project delivery is a bounded system that is generally subject to controlled or managed changes 
in parameters within its boundaries.  Project- and system-level matters are not mutually 
exclusive and should not be assumed to be one and the same. 
  
  
 Whilst infrastructure systems are dynamic, for those infrastructure types with the ongoing 
delivery of assets/projects/programmes, that state of flux and change is exacerbated.  This is 
because, excluding most renewals, capital works or projects are ultimately designed to develop 
and change both the assets and function of the system.  
 The lifecycle (and its key stages of strategy/planning, capital works, and 
operations/maintenance) is more than just a theoretical model, it can also reflect/dictate 
organisational structures, silos, and processes.  It is notable that many organisations within the 
physical/built infrastructure sectors (i.e. roads, rail, energy, waters) are implicitly arranged to 
reflect this lifecycle., 
Infrastructure exists as a ‘project’ for only a small proportion of its lifecycle before being absorbed 
into the system that the project was intended to transform.  In this respect, infrastructure is 
‘chaordic’ (Olmedo, 2010), as outcomes and feedback are inextricably linked with and change in the 
environment/context (i.e. playing the game, changes the game).  The alternative, systems lifecycle 
developed by Blom (2014) which also re-orients practice to customer-oriented outcomes, reflects 
these dynamic, chaordic properties and so provides an underpinning conceptual model of the 
infrastructure system for this research (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2:  Infrastructure system lifecycle model 
Source:  Adapted from Blom (2014) 
  
Key terms 
Horwath (2009) is of the opinion that “the “what” you’re trying to achieve, whether it be a goal, an 
objective, or a long term vision, should never be confused with “how” you will achieve it, which is 
strategy”.  This research concerned itself, not with the “how”, but rather the strategic aspirations 
and outcomes which have been collectively referred to as the strategic intent.  This emphasises the 
focus on outcomes and benefits rather than artefacts and features.   
To this end, this research explores the nexus of public administration and services, engineering and 
technical practice, with infrastructure management and governance.  Public infrastructure is that 
used by or within the public realm, and in New Zealand (the focus of the detailed studies), this is 
generally in some form of public ownership (New Zealand Government, 2011).  It is acknowledged 
that, elsewhere, this might not always be the case; however, the focus here is upon the underlying 
infrastructure (engineering) management practice.  Infrastructure management, here, means a 
hybrid of management, engineering, and other practice areas.  As such, this distinguishes between 
the business acumen currently expected within the public sector and infrastructure organisations 
that exist as a commercial enterprise.  In a similar vein, infrastructure governance refers to 
governance provided by a board of directors.  Whilst political matters will be germane, they are 
outside the scope of this research; as one interviewee observed “We can still have good governance 
if you’ve got bad politics” [PR58]. 
Infrastructure systems, then, are an enduring complex of services, assets, projects, and networks — 
all at different stages of their lifecycles —dynamically affecting one another as they develop, then 
age.  Moreover, assets in themselves are not sufficient for the delivery of outcomes, and so 
underline the importance of the service(s) delivered by built infrastructure.  This is the very essence 
of what defines infrastructure, which is "the basic physical and organisational structures and 
facilities (e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or enterprise” 
("Oxford English Dictionary (online version)," 2014; emphasis added). 
Research approach 
In this context, the central hypothesis proposed that:  
The strategic intent and the day-to-day management of infrastructure systems are often 
misaligned, with negative consequences for achieving the desired long-term 
infrastructure system outcomes.   
This was augmented by three underpinning propositions: 
1. Individual infrastructure projects automatically, by their nature, become part of, embedded in, 
and change, a complex infrastructural system (e.g. interactions, feedback, emergent properties). 
  
2. The governance and management of such systems will not be effective if focused on outputs at 
the level of projects, assets, or even subsystems.  Governance and management needs to 
address the desired/intended strategic, externally-oriented outcomes and aptitude of the whole 
system.  They also need to address the contributions of individual projects and of the day-to-day 
operations to that system. 
3. No matter how well individual projects are designed and delivered, or strategic outcomes are 
initially defined, systems are dynamic.  Accordingly, infrastructure administration needs to both 
accommodate and continually respond to this time dimension.   
The challenge and level of uncertainty here is such that the hypothesis might be considered broad.  
However, this is the reality for those that are charged with addressing this in practice (Bazerman, 
1994; Brugnach, Dewulf, Pahl-Wostl, & Taillieu, 2008; Snowden, 2005). 
When faced with the scale, complexity, and goal-seeking (i.e. dynamic) nature of systems such as 
infrastructure, Ackoff (1994) and Snowden and Boone (2007) share the view that a probing approach 
is required.  Not only does this ‘sample’ the system (recalling that there is no single solution to a 
complex problem or problem within a complex system); it can also assist in identifying and/or 
assessing ‘points of leverage’.  These are points at which a small intervention can result in a 
disproportionate change or system-level outcome (e.g. Bosch, Nguyen, Maeno, & Yasui, 2013; 
Hudson, 2006). 
This philosophy is reflected in the staged methodology (Figure 3), which entailed preliminary 
research across infrastructure sectors and countries, before focusing on the New Zealand land 
transport sector for detailed study (but still drawing on the broader material; Blom and Guthrie 
(2017c)).  Usefully, the New Zealand land transport sector is strongly centralised, and largely in 
public ownership.  The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) administers funding for land transport 
infrastructure and services through the National Land Transport Programme, in addition to 
performing its other functions (which includes the management of the national State highway 
network).  Local land transport is largely managed by local government, and is partially funded 
through rates.  Auckland Transport is the entity accountable for managing local-level land transport 
within New Zealand’s largest city and most populated region, Auckland.  Both organisations are 
charged with implementing a ‘One Network’ approach for the region.   
The detailed studies looked at both organisations, and considered some of the interfaces between 
the two (e.g. overlapping performance measures, funding-related practice and requirements, 
common standards, and ‘One Network’ aspirations).  Further detail for the three deep dives 
(detailed studies) is provided in Table 1. 
 
  
PART I PART II PART III 
Is there misalignment, and how is this 
recognised as a problem within the 
wider infrastructure industry?  What 
are the stories? 
How is the misalignment being 
generated (what are the reasons for 
the misalignment)? 
What characterises this misalignment 
or gap?  Given this, what are the 
implications, if any, for infrastructure 
administration and long-term 
infrastructure outcomes? 
LITERATURE REVIEW   
PRELIMINARY RESEARCH  
59 interviews: 
 40 across multiple sectors 
 19 in sector –single organisation 
 51 in NZ / 8 in EU 
 Global experiences 
 Cross-sectoral 
 Cross-disciplinary 
 Cross-functional:  Positional  
& role 
  
 
 
Topics and stories  
(triangulation with wider industry) 
Themes and areas for further 
research:   
DEEP DIVES  
Strategy—project transition 
 
System benefits management 
(Auckland Transport): 
 Mapping of strategic plan/KPI 
connectivity 
 Benefit visibility to board 
 Project benefits – AMETI 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
Project—operations transition Whole-of-life management  
(Auckland Transport): 
 AMETI phase 1 
 Consequential OPEX (cOPEX) 
 First principle estimates 
 Wider implications  
Operations—strategy transition Performance management  
(NZTA): 
 Road smoothness indicator of 
customer comfort 
 Customer workshops 
 Nationally significant survey (NZ) 
  
 PRACTITIONER/PRACTICE 
OUTCOMES 
 THEORETICAL/ACADEMIC 
CONTRIBUTION 
Figure 3:  Overarching research methodology 
  
  
Table 1:  Summary of detailed study methodologies 
LIFECYCLE 
INTERFACE 
SUMMARY 
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Detailed study 1:  System benefit management 
See Blom and Guthrie (2017a) 
Brief description:  How strategic connectivity and benefit visibility at board level interrelates with 
projects. 
Organisation:  Auckland Transport (local government organisation) 
Level:  Strategic Scale:  Macro 
Methodology:  Cross-sectional analysis through current practice, including analysis of: 
a) Connectivity of current organisational strategies and directives/how strategic intent transitions into 
strategy (mapping of 6 key strategic documents); 
b) Benefit visibility within board reporting/how strategic intent and benefits (outcomes) are reported 
and managed within the governance context (analysis of 765 board reports); 
c) How benefits have been managed and transition within the project context (site visit, review of 128 
project documents). 
Plus a cross-analysis/synthesis of the implications for the strategy to project interface. 
Notes:   
 Links to strategic intent via strategic plans and project objectives. 
 Auckland Transport has recently melded best practice from across 1 regional and 7 local councils. 
 No formal process in place (project-level benefit management under development).   
 Links to wider land transport funding and strategic objectives as local government must demonstrate 
‘strategic fit’ as part of NZTA funding applications (NZTA, 2013). 
 Benefit delivery is of shared concern in wider New Zealand land transport organisations and across 
other infrastructure sectors (Blom & Guthrie, 2017c). 
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Detailed study 2:  Whole-of-life management  
See Blom and Guthrie (2017b) 
Brief description:  Post project delivery, operational estimating of the cOPEX arising from new projects 
and programmes. 
Organisation:  Auckland Transport (local government organisation) 
Level:  Operational Scale:  Meso 
Methodology:  Cross-sectional analysis through current practice, including: 
a) Analysis of project documentation to collate operational costs and trace how obligations have been 
managed and transition through the project development (site visit, review of 128 project 
documents); 
b) First principle development of cOPEX schedule and comparison against other current estimates (6 
additional interviews, estimating workshop). 
c) Cross-analysis of the implications for the project to operations interface. 
  
LIFECYCLE 
INTERFACE 
SUMMARY 
Notes:   
 Links to strategic intent via project objectives, operational budgets, and scope/levels of service.   
 Auckland Transport has recently melded best practice from across 1 regional and 7 local councils.   
 No formal process in place.  Auckland Transport has recently completed an asset-based estimate of 
the first stage of a significant programme, enabling comparison across estimating techniques and 
approaches.   
 Long-term costs are an identified issue for New Zealand local authorities in general (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2014a).  Whole-of-life costs were also identified as wider infrastructure issue (Blom 
& Guthrie, 2017c). 
 Links to wider land transport funding as local government must calculate whole-of-life costs as part of 
NZTA funding applications (NZTA, 2013).  Wider deliverables must also demonstrate strategic fit with 
overarching objectives. 
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Detailed study 3:  Performance management   
See Blom, De Marco, and Guthrie (2015); Blom and Guthrie (2015) 
Brief description:  Road smoothness as an indicator of the strategic objective to improve customer 
comfort.  
Organisation:  NZTA (central government organisation) 
Level:  Tactical Scale:  Micro 
Methodology:  First principle reassessment of current practice, including: 
a) Workshops with infrastructure customers to canvas issues and to focus/pilot more comprehensive 
assessment (3 workshops across urban/rural New Zealand); 
b) National survey of customers (1,619 useable responses, 95% level of confidence); 
c) Assessment of the implications for the operations to strategy interface. 
Notes:   
 Links to strategic intent as a performance indicator for a strategic objective.   
 Road smoothness is a widely used national and international indicator.  As well as being a measure of 
customer comfort by the NZTA (NZTA, 2011, 2014), it is a mandatory reporting measure for local 
government in New Zealand (Department of Internal Affairs, 2013).   
 Performance management identified as a wider issue for New Zealand land transport organisations 
and across other infrastructure sector (Blom & Guthrie, 2017c). 
For completeness and context, it is noted that the public administration of land transport in New 
Zealand is of international standing, particularly in areas such as asset management (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2014b; Federal Highways Administration, 2005).  This research was therefore 
aimed at providing an evidence base to encourage and support positive change in infrastructure 
administration beyond the subject organisations, sector, and country. 
  
  
Overview of preceding research 
Preliminary research 
Given research in the area of whole-of-system working is emergent and lacking within the built 
infrastructure sectors, it was important to firstly understand what is actually believed or actually 
known within the infrastructure industry, for it does not automatically stand that:  
 There is a systemic problem and that this is recognised (i.e. there is a problem that exists or is 
recognised beyond individual examples and stories);  
 There is substantive evidence of the problem; 
 The problem is material or its nature is understood; and  
 Anything is being done about it.   
Accordingly, the research firstly investigated industry perceptions in order to test and confirm the 
problem: the nub of which was found to be the inability to fully deliver appropriate and relevant 
infrastructure outcomes over the long term.  In describing the overarching problem, many 
interviewees pointed to a misalignment between the intended strategic, or system-level, outcomes 
(or benefits) and the delivery, or management of those outcomes over the longer term.  What was 
also clear was that there was no real understanding of the scale and scope of that misalignment, nor 
the significance of any implications, because system-level outcomes were not being given sufficient 
attention.  It was found that whilst the primary issue might be simple to articulate, it is paradoxically 
complex.  Accordingly, ‘leverage points’ were identified as the focus for further research at this time 
and the most advantageous points at which to ‘deep dive’. 
Deep dives 
The organisational ‘deep dive’ is a diagnostic tool used to gauge strategic performance and cut 
through organisational practice in detail (e.g. Horwath, 2009; Yu & Bower, 2009).  The deep dive is a 
particularly effective means of testing whether strategic intent has been organised into actions that 
will have meaning at multiple levels.  Here, three primary lifecycle/organisational interfaces 
emerged as the key areas of interest and leverage at this time: strategy—project, project—
operations, and operations—strategy.  The detailed studies supported the findings of the 
preliminary research and showed there to be areas of systemic practice that are having a material 
effect upon long-term outcomes (Table 2).  However, those effects were not often visible to the 
system itself; being acts of omission rather than commission.   
  
  
Table 2:  Summary of detailed study results 
STRATEGY—PROJECT TRANSITION PROJECT—OPERATIONS TRANSITION OPERATIONS—STRATEGY 
TRANSITION 
System benefits management 
(Auckland Transport): 
 Mapping of strategic plans/KPIs 
 Benefit visibility in board reporting 
 Project benefits - AMETI 
Whole-of-life management  
(Auckland Transport): 
 AMETI phase 1 
 Consequential OPEX (cOPEX) 
 First principle estimates 
 Wider implications 
Performance management  
(NZ Transport Agency): 
 Road smoothness indicator of 
customer comfort 
 Customer workshops 
 Nationally significant survey (NZ) 
How is the misalignment being generated (what are the reasons for the misalignment)? 
Strategic Mapping: 
 Homogeneity:  dominance by 
assets and projects 
 Document (Strategy) order 
 Poor iteration/change 
management 
 New strategies/measures as a 
response to problems 
 Ability to understand, connect and 
align all parts of the system. 
cOPEX estimating practice: 
 Actual cOPEX unknown – inhibits 
feed forward, learning, feedback 
 No whole-of organisation 
approach.   
 Whole-of-life may have different 
scope/meaning 
 Dominated by familiar assets – 
services and multi-functional 
assets not well provided for (more 
often missing) 
 Investment processes over-reach 
(e.g. long-term cOPEX missing 
including for major structures).  
Investment not operationally 
focused. 
 Best for project can hide some 
costs 
 No provision for change, events, 
adaptive management 
Workshops: 
 Terminology and the range of 
given issues often assumed - can 
be irrelevant/have different 
meaning to customers 
 Focusing on technical issues too 
early curtails meaning/learning 
 Embedded belief system inhibit 
inquiry  
 Organisational, contract, and 
administrative boundaries are 
irrelevant to customers 
 Monitoring inherently assumed to 
contribute to strategic intent  
 Face-to-face customer interaction 
around needs rare 
Benefit visibility: 
 Dominance by features (outputs) 
 Lack of system-level benefit 
visibility 
 Disconnect between strategic 
intent and project benefits 
 Reported follow-through and 
feedback non-existent 
 Unclear how teams act on 
others/strategic intent 
Project-level benefit management: 
 Under development/emergent 
 Focused on project not system 
 Dominated by tipping points from 
BCR (e.g. traffic) 
 Lack of disbenefit management 
 
 Deferred benefits – over-claimed 
system benefits  
 No feedback, feed-forward, or 
follow-through 
Assessment of wider implications: 
 Dominated by project processes – 
best for project 
 Embedded misalignment through 
institutional lock-in 
 
 
 Information not accessible post-
project nor prepared for 
operational needs 
 Assumed accountability 
boundaries/belief that excluded 
matters are dealt with elsewhere 
 Other costs/actions (e.g. project 
defects, compliance) not in 
budgets (absorbed/hidden) 
 Known requirements not 
transferred  – become unknown 
unknowns 
 Deferred benefits – over-claimed 
system benefits in business cases 
Survey: 
 Don’t usually ask potential/new 
customers 
 Don’t target all customers (reflect 
technical/mode bias) 
 Don’t survey beliefs or reflect the 
complexity of an issue 
 Satisfaction is a sliding scale and 
does not necessarily enable 
change, correlation to 
conditions/context, enable the 
system to evolve/learn 
 Customers have different needs in 
different contexts and over time – 
current approaches over simplify 
Synthesis: 
 Dynamics of system not managed 
 Benefits not understood at 
multiple dimensions (scale, 
customer, function, timescale etc) 
 Embedded misalignment through 
incremental change 
 Wider corporate practice (e.g. 
HR/personal performance 
  
STRATEGY—PROJECT TRANSITION PROJECT—OPERATIONS TRANSITION OPERATIONS—STRATEGY 
TRANSITION 
requirements) can also impede  No feedback/forward 
 Third party disconnects 
 No programme staging reviews 
Effects 
 Absence of service-related 
strategy (and outcomes) 
 Loss of connectivity and 
transparency 
 Complicated framework – 
proliferation of requirements 
 Unclear how individuals, teams etc 
contribute 
(counterproductive/silos) 
 Loss of knowledge/reduced 
capacity for organisational 
learning 
 Red-queen business with unknown 
progress/benefits not visible 
 Loss of customer voice 
 Loss of outcomes (simplification, 
homogeneity of 
customer/function/service) 
 Movement of things misconstrued 
as movement of people (technical 
vs service outcomes) 
 Does not support strategic intent 
 Can have material impact upon 
total system OPEX – need to 
understand these are not from 
new but omitted requirements   
 Overplays project benefits and 
underplays operational 
requirements 
 Hidden system benefit loss 
through inadequate OPEX spend 
 Omitted cOPEX equates to 
omitted actions/levels of 
service/outcomes – narrow asset-
centric focus 
 Does not support strategic intent 
 Poor cOPEX estimating impacts on 
future budgets/opportunities 
/levels of service/outcomes 
 Erodes services, multi-functional 
assets, mitigation, trans-
organisational/departmental 
(wider) outcomes and long-term 
asset life/performance 
 Does not provide for 
all/future/new customers 
 Particularly does not provide for 
vulnerable customers 
 Does not reflect multi-functional 
assets or the multiple services 
provided by those assets 
 May address how customers feel 
using the asset – but does not 
consider how the asset serves 
their lives (confuses interaction 
with an asset with enabling 
societal outcomes) 
 Many effects unknown/hidden as 
not measured 
 Does not reflect the complexity of 
outcomes such as improved 
comfort 
 Does not support strategic intent 
 Does not enable meaning 
feedback/forward to strategy (or 
projects and operations) 
Implications and interventions 
 Project-level benefit management 
is not enough – benefits must also 
be managed at system level 
 System stewardship required:  
System-level 
synthesis/management of multiple 
benefits and multi-dimension 
benefits plus system dynamics 
 Deferred benefits need to be 
understood and managed 
 Corporate process (e.g. HR) also 
needs to align to outcomes 
 Detailed interventions per 
specifics of case/organisation 
 Change needed to cOPEX 
estimating practice, particularly 
for system transforming projects 
 Need to follow project threads 
through organisation/system so 
fully integrated/embedded  
 Whole-of-organisation approach 
to whole-of-life required  
 Deferred benefits and adaptive 
capacity need to be understood 
and managed 
 Corporate process (e.g. 
accounting/finance) also needs to 
align to outcomes 
 
 Governance to reflect on true 
OPEX and drive ongoing system 
review 
 Technical practice needs to evolve 
to reflect changes in context (e.g. 
society, technology) 
 Care is needed so that all 
customers are heard; particularly 
the vulnerable 
 Not all outcomes are equal – 
technical outcomes are not the 
same as system outcomes 
 Changing KPIs alone insufficient-
systemic change required 
 Outcomes may not be enough –
measures need to include system 
aptitudes 
 
 Feedback needs to feed forward.  
Monitoring needs to generate 
information (not data) to enable 
the system to evolve. 
 
  
  
Cross-case analysis 
The third part of the research, and focus of this paper, comprised a cross-case analysis of the 
system-level implications arising from the deep dives.  To deduce the overarching themes, the 
results and case-specific thematic outcomes from the detailed studies were revisited through a 
‘system-level’ lens, categorised, and sorted alongside those from the preliminary research.  This 
resulted in four interrelated themes, which are each discussed in turn below: 
 Bounded influence, which is shaped by four aspects: 
- Organisational structure; 
- Strategic reach; 
- Transfer dimensions; and 
- Salience. 
 Business practice; 
 Feedback; and 
 System stewardship. 
It is these matters that contribute to, and characterise, the gap between the strategic intent and 
management of infrastructure systems.   
Bounded influence 
Each of the detailed studies explored an infrastructure lifecycle transition or interface.  ‘Handover 
disconnects’ are a well-known problem, and current convention is that the transitions are 
unidirectional (Figure 1).  Handover dysfunction is often seen as solvable by checklists and data 
transfer, and obviously this may work well in certain situations.  However, the studies have shown 
that not only were all of the researched lifecycle interfaces complex and multi-directional, they were 
further complicated by layers of what will be termed ‘bounded influence’ (Bourne & Walker, 2005).  
Here, bounded influence refers to matters which limit influence and the ability to implement the 
change necessary to give effect to the intended outcomes.  The willingness, capability, and/or 
capacity to effect that change is a separate matter.  The four key aspects contributing to the 
observed bounded influence are discussed below. 
Organisational structure 
The effect of organisational silos is also well recognised, and often focused upon the project–
operations interface.  However, study 2 in particular, challenged this by highlighting disconnects 
created by the relative ease at which the primary functions are, in fact, identifiable silos.  To this 
end, whilst the capital development part of the study organisation was complex, ‘the project’ was 
typically a known or identifiable team.  However, in reality, ‘operations’ was not as neatly 
  
identifiable as it comprises multiple functions within the organisation.  This raises a number of 
fundamental questions: 
 Who or where within the organisation was ‘the project’ to be handed to, and who was 
accountable for the outcomes (including co-ordination and integration with other newly 
delivered capital works)?   
 Who was accountable for that process?  Was this capital development given the tendency to 
close a project shortly after close of contract, and/or was there an individual in operations (given 
the need to follow the ‘threads’ through the organisation)?  ‘Threads’ refers to strands of logic, 
requirements, and/or actions that might affect or need to be embedded within other parts of 
the organisation (e.g. strategy, benefits, compliance or other requirements, levels of service, 
standards). 
 Who subsequently ‘owns’ those threads, where they are stored, and what value they are given 
over time (or when they are lost)? 
 Who, then, was responsible for providing integrated operational feedback to those developing 
strategy, or was the customer/user voice on a project? 
To date, many of these issues have been managed through tools such as an asset management 
database.  However, as complexity increases and infrastructure is re-purposed, such tools are no 
longer adequate on their own, have become a proxy for decision-making, and enable the abrogation 
of responsibilities.  After all, “to codify method is to impede thinking” (Seddon, 2008).  This was 
visible in all three studies, but was particularly demonstrated by the limitations of current cOPEX 
estimating practice and the use of an overly simplified performance measure (road smoothness) as 
an indicator for strategic intent (improved customer outcomes; customer comfort).   
Furthermore, such a simplified view of operations is problematic in large organisations, where 
‘operations’ consists of multiple departments and functions including multi-modal services.  In this 
regard, detailed studies 1 and 2 also demonstrated that effective change or ongoing implementation 
was not simply a matter for the asset management team and that delineation according to 
organisational structure, system tools, and/or processes does not account for all requirements.  
Instead, the ‘threads’ need to be firstly defined and understood and then followed through the 
organisation to their logical conclusion.  This is inclusive of any consequences (secondary threads) 
generated by that process.  Moreover, because public infrastructure organisations can best be 
viewed as a complex adaptive system, this is (necessarily) an ongoing and evolving process. 
Infrastructure only exists as a project for a very short period of its lifespan.  Post-delivery, it 
disperses across and is absorbed by the physical and organisational system.  The transition is 
  
perhaps less about project to operations, than project to system.  This is where the notion of system 
stewardship developed within study 1 has merit (see inset).  As one interviewee observed: 
We’re bringing together…literally dozens of disparate systems that have not been designed 
to…work together or invested in, as a coherent collection of networks.  So we are having to 
get to grips with…different pieces of infrastructure, not necessarily aligning nicely 
with…the way the network is operated…we’re still probably adding operating costs that we 
would be better to avoid.  And…I’m not being critical of what we’re doing… …[but] we’ve 
got quite a bit more…to achieve. [PR19] 
 Proposition 1:  Individual infrastructure projects automatically, by their nature, become part of, embedded 
in, and change, a complex infrastructural system (e.g. interactions, feedback, emergent properties). 
SYSTEM STEWARDSHIP 
Zimmerman and Sparrow (1997) describe stewardship as “a collective sense of ownership or 
accountability”.  Here, system stewardship is envisaged as an ‘ecosystem orchestrator’ to ensure 
ongoing system fitness.  Ultimately, system stewardship might evolve into a cultural norm.  Until 
then, it may require the establishment of a specific role or organisational function to enable its 
development and implementation (much the same as health and safety or sustainability).  The figure 
below indicates where this function might sit within a generic infrastructure administration structure 
(potentially introducing the role of ‘system steward’ to better define accountabilities).  This is further 
described in Blom and Guthrie (2017a). 
 
  
Strategic reach 
Currie and Proctor (in Walshe, Harvey, & Jas, 2010, p. 251) advise that: 
Although the public sector literature is giving increased attention to strategy, there have 
so far been few explanations about how public sector managers develop and implement 
new strategic approaches. 
Whilst study 3 investigates the implementation of a new, customer-oriented strategy (NZTA, 2014), 
it was study 1 which charted the development of the strategic framework of a newly formed 
infrastructure organisation, through to project delivery, and, through study 2, to operational 
implementation.  This showed that the effectiveness and overall ‘reach’ of strategies was being 
curtailed from their formation. 
As one delved deeper into the organisation and wider industry, the impediments to the delivery of 
strategy kept building.  Study 2 demonstrated the significant role played by handover omissions and 
other systemic disconnects.  All studies found that, in general, outcomes relating to existing 
organisational processes or tools were more likely to be retained than: 
 Complex/non-standard assets (e.g. architectural features); 
 Long-term requirements (e.g. maintenance for long-design-life structures); 
 Those relating to: 
- How the infrastructure enabled society (e.g. provision for local place-making, customer 
comfort); or  
- Its context (e.g. environmental mitigation or enhancement).   
There was a sense of society working around its infrastructure, despite the strategic intent expressed 
by the infrastructure organisations responsible for its management. 
Whilst the subject organisations showed a broad awareness of their overarching strategic direction, 
generic strategic justifications in organisational processes and documents also led to disconnects, or 
strategies being reinterpreted by different parts of the business.  This led to the partitioning of 
outcomes by functional area and compounded the barriers to the organisation as a whole aligning 
with its strategic intent.  Certain strategies appeared to be favoured over others because they might 
have sustained a convention or ‘belief-system’.  Others have also encountered this.  For example, in 
relation to study 3: 
NZTA has a detailed set of technical levels of service and overarching performance 
targets and measures for maintenance and renewal work.  But it was unclear how these 
levels of service were determined, or what they mean for road users… …NZTA's 
overarching levels of service for pavement maintenance were inherited…and have been 
  
in place for many years… …It told us that these…are comparable with those of overseas 
roading authorities…(Controller and Auditor-General, 2010, p. 36) 
Accordingly, this also serves in underlining the importance of the deep dive from first principles 
(Dobbs, Manyika, & Woetzel, 2015). 
Study 1 found that the organisation was well-connected to some strategies whilst others had been 
completely omitted without documented justification: strategic connectivity by preference, not plan.  
This raises the issue of who decides which factors are most important, and what is to be omitted, 
particularly where there are democratic and statutory processes that call for transparency and invite 
public participation in the decision-making.  This, in turn, affected board reporting, leading to study 1 
asking “If not the board, then who is responsible for closing the system-level strategic loop?” (Blom & 
Guthrie, 2017a). 
Detailed studies 1 and 3 highlighted the importance outcome-oriented performance plays in 
affecting strategic reach.  However, not all outcomes are equal.  This point was made in study 3, 
whereby outcomes need to be directed at two levels: 
 How an individual interacts with the asset (e.g. they have a pleasant experience, and don’t feel 
unsafe or vulnerable); and 
 How the infrastructure enables that individual’s life/business (they can do what they want to, 
when they want to). 
Many of the performance ‘outcomes’ encountered during this research were focused on the first of 
these.  This might provide valuable information on maintenance and asset performance, but is 
ultimately introspective and may not necessarily align with community expectation or need.  Rather, 
technical requirements are system-level outputs, not outcomes.  This touches on two further 
matters that bound, or limit, influence: transfer dimensions and salience. 
Transfer dimensions 
In study 3, analysis of all the workshop material showed effecting change was a matter of: 
 Needs:  What is delivered and how it is delivered; 
 Precepts:  What customers believe or expect to be delivered; 
 Choices:  Whether the choices are appropriate, purposeful, and that compromises have been 
understood;  
 Aptitudes:  Whether there is the ability to change both reactively and proactively; 
 Process/technical requirements; and 
 Institutions/entities/functions. 
  
The first four of these had been firstly identified as ‘problem dimensions’ within the preliminary 
research, and were subsequently found to affect how problems were being understood by the 
organisation within study 1. 
It emerged from study 3 that whilst attending to ‘needs’ might be obvious and relatively 
straightforward, this was likely to curtail the effectiveness of the project–system transfer and 
amalgamation.  This was due to the disproportionate influence of secondary areas such as ‘precepts’ 
and ‘aptitude’, and pointed to the importance of addressing such matters if change was to be 
effective.   
By contrast, study 2 identified a slightly different range of factors and proposed a whole-of-life 
change matrix as a result.  Although aimed at effecting change across the infrastructure lifecycle 
(‘lifecycle change’), and also to account for organisation change requirements, there was 
nonetheless overlap with the preliminary research and the other detailed studies (e.g. process, 
organisational belief, structure, function).  Furthermore, all the dimensions/factors encountered 
across the research programme were found to reinforce disconnects with strategic intent through 
omission, organisational inertia, and factors such as redirection/reinterpretation.  Therefore, to 
effectively transfer a project into an operational infrastructure system, whilst retaining the intended 
outcomes across the infrastructure lifecycle, change processes need to address the organisational, 
lifecycle, and wider contextual outcomes that are the imperative of infrastructure (‘contextual 
change’).  These terms appear as dimensions of change within Figure 5, to be discussed later. 
Salience 
Salience is “who and to what managers actually pay attention” (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).  
Similarly, Ramsden and Spoonley (1993) ask who defines what is important.  The detailed studies 
highlighted a range of salience-related factors, for example:  
 The ability of customers to be ‘heard’ over technical and funding considerations; 
 The voice of the vulnerable customer; 
 Relative performance and levels of service between areas and modes; 
 ‘Best for project’ over operational and system-level considerations; 
 Control, responsibility, culture, and familiarity/convention; 
 Perceived personal relevance/interest (e.g. introspective outcomes, disciplinary background); 
 The relative level of attention given to tasks related to performance measures; and 
 Visibility of an issue. 
It is the first two of these matters that are perhaps of the greatest importance due to the meaning of 
infrastructure and public administration.  Whilst study 3 explored this matter directly and in the 
most detail, the issue of stakeholder, community, or customer salience was a recurring theme 
  
throughout all detailed studies and the preliminary research interviews.  Worryingly, the inclusion of 
customers as active participants is deemed ‘unorthodox’ for industry (Moodley, 2015). 
Bonsall, Beale, Paulley, and Pedler (2005) note that few customer surveys and studies considered 
customer beliefs.  Study 1 picked up this theme by recommending the inclusion of a belief-oriented 
performance measure to assist the development and assessment of customer-oriented outcomes.  
The study also highlighted the lack of customer voice during the operational phase to protect or 
argue for the retention of outcomes or levels of service.  Given the requirement for community 
participation in the study context, this was not so much about higher-order community consultation, 
but where or who within this amorphous area of ‘operations’ was the proxy for the customer voice 
(and which customers were being ‘heard’ the most). 
Business practice 
Failure to account for the lifecycle and context dimensions of infrastructure was shown to impact on 
the ability to deliver appropriate outcomes in all three of the detailed studies.  Accounting 
convention (study 2) was particularly problematic with issues ranging from the over-reaching of 
investment assessment tools (e.g. use of BCR parameters or discounting in the assessment of long-
term requirements and costs), through to budgetary horizons, and the management of non-
standard/complex assets/services.  Hussein and Hafseld (2016) too, describe a range of 
organisational influences encountered by a governmental project in Norway.  Many of the issues 
raised, such as culture, human resources frameworks, change management, and user involvement 
are issues-in-common with this research, which found these can create a form of ‘running 
interference’.   
The point is improved co-ordination, incremental improvement/establishment of best practice is 
unlikely to be sufficient and may result in perverse outcomes.  Just as engineering and other 
technical processes may need to change mental models and orthodoxy to provide better alignment 
with customer- and system-level outcomes (i.e. efficacy), business practices do too.  This is an area 
for further research and development for the relevant sectors. 
Feedback 
The wider industry interviews and subsequent detailed studies found that benefits (infrastructure 
outcomes) are: 
 Often being deferred or are not being followed through during project delivery; 
Note that the ‘follow-through of benefits is not just a matter of completing a project checklist.  
This is also a matter of (for example) resolving conflicts, delivering consequential 
actions/requirements, and ensuring services and operational matters are provided for and 
handed over. 
  
 Rarely followed up and reassessed post-project delivery;  
 Frequently not following on within the wider operational system; and 
 Mistaken for technical and/or administrative measures during both operations and project 
delivery. 
This affects organisational memory as the information is not available to feed forward into the 
incremental development and the evolution of strategy (Thiry & Deguire, 2007).  Ackoff (1971, p. 
665) has observed that if a goal-seeking system has memory, then “it can increase its efficiency over 
time in producing the outcome that is its goal”. 
Where feedback was encountered in this research, it was generally found to be in the realm of 
incremental improvement.  Such feedback is introspective —little more than a lessons-learned 
exercise aimed at the project level —useful, but not all that is required from a system perspective.  
The reduced scope and project-level specificity reinforced retrospection and a perceived or actual 
reduction in wider applicability: 
 Because an infrastructure system consists of assets, projects, and networks at various stages in 
their lifecycle, an end-of-pipe expectation of feedback is neither practicable, nor likely to 
happen, because: 
- Of the time scales involved;  
- Of the existence of silos, not only within the infrastructure organisation itself, but within its 
consultant teams, who may specialise in one particular stage of infrastructure management 
(e.g. scheme assessment and consenting versus detailed design or construction supervision); 
- Infrastructure is a chaordic system (Olmedo, 2010); and 
- There is not, in fact, an end to the process as a project may be one of many that are 
simultaneously acting on an infrastructure system (Figure 2). 
 Not only is there a need to feed back between lifecycle phases, but there is also the need to do 
so between the organisational levels of strategy, operations and tactical management.   
This is where the depiction of feedback processes, can be problematic as they do not incorporate 
the ongoing change to a system that occurs independently of any transformative feedback (e.g. 
Figure 4).  This is not just a matter of graphics.  Rather, this was found to be more indicative of how 
feedback was both being thought of, and thence managed, in practice.  Whilst Figure 4 shows two 
additional levels of feedback and learning, there is yet another (complementary) way to look at this.  
This is that, quite simply —but paradoxically —when viewed as a dynamic and evolving system, feed-
back actually feeds-forward and contributes to systemic change.  This includes enhancing 
organisational learning; as study 3 found, this is vital given the changing technology and complexity 
of infrastructure. 
  
At face value, this might seem at odds with calls to improve foresighting practice (Snowden & Boone, 
2007).  But feedback/feed forward is not the same as foresight, and both need to be accommodated 
and reconciled; for unless feed forward occurs, strategies are at risk of redundancy without this 
necessarily being immediately clear.  As discussed earlier, this is particularly so, given the chaordic 
nature of the system.  Accordingly, infrastructure administration needs to be re-oriented to system-
level matters. 
 
Figure 4:  Feedback as a sequence of learning cycles 
Source:  Pahl-Wostl (2009) 
 Proposition 2:  The governance and management of such systems will not be effective if focused on 
outputs at the level of projects, assets, or even subsystems.  Governance and management needs to 
address the desired/intended strategic, externally-oriented outcomes and aptitude of the whole system.  
They also need to address the contributions of individual projects and of the day-to-day operations to that 
system. 
System stewardship 
The ‘better use of existing assets’, as a first step towards improved infrastructure outcomes, is not 
just a matter of asset management.  It is enabled by both managing the transfer and system 
assimilation of new projects/renewals and services (studies 2 and 3), and the ongoing stewardship of 
customer-oriented benefits over the long term in a continually changing system and its interrelated 
context (all studies).   
Change management in the context of an infrastructure system has been discussed already as has 
the importance of feedback as a feed-forward mechanism.  The latter was highlighted by studies 1 
and 3 and in particular the role community engagement and collaboration played in that 
feedback/feed-forward flow.  However, providing an integrated operational response can be 
  
challenging when ‘operations’ is, by contrast to a project’s delivery, a diverse group of autonomous 
functions. 
During the preliminary research interviews, it was observed that roles such as that of the borough 
engineer (who had oversight of the infrastructure of an area) no longer exists.  As the system 
increased in complexity, this has, through necessity, increased specialisation.  So as a consequence, 
this specialism created a barrier to systems-thinking.  The ‘glue’ within the organisation and/or the 
system had been lost, and any connection to “social advancement or social improvement” had also 
gone missing [PR51]. 
Whilst all studies highlighted the need for silo-spanning roles, the effect of silos and specialisation 
was particularly noticeable in both studies 2 and 3 where benefits were being eroded by, for 
example, falling between decision-making boundaries, functions, or management processes and 
tools, or between management and governance.  To respond to the issues raised within study 1, a 
model for system stewardship was proposed to reintroduce this system overview.  
Accordingly, the three dimensions of lifecycle, organisational and context-oriented change, have 
been integrated with the notion of system stewardship and centred on externally-oriented 
outcomes (i.e. the customer).  The aim is to provide a framework for how the project-system 
transition and other system-level change might be improved (Figure 5), and to enable learning and 
adaptive capacity. 
 
Figure 5:  Infrastructure system change management framework 
  
This integration is important, but will inevitably require the balancing and management of 
requirements, or ‘threads’ through the system —and over time.  This is not a unidirectional 
framework, but provides for iteration and feedback/feed-forward.  As such, this aims to give voice 
and visibility to customer-oriented outcomes (and synaptic-like system connectivity).    
The framework also provides a forum for reconciling and managing all the dimensions of change and 
system dynamics/evolution that appear, from the research, to be necessary to effect strategic 
intent.  This research has shown that these integrated aspects are missing from current practice with 
a resultant adverse effect upon long-term infrastructure outcomes. 
 Proposition 3:  No matter how well individual projects are designed and delivered, or strategic outcomes 
are initially defined, systems are dynamic.  Accordingly, infrastructure administration needs to both 
accommodate and continually respond to this time dimension. 
Implications for long-term infrastructure outcomes 
The long-term implications arising from the management of infrastructure systems being unable to 
connect with, fulfil, or align with strategic intent are complex and interwoven with the four themes 
just discussed.  Just as study 3 highlighted two levels of outcomes (inward and outward looking), and 
all studies two levels of response (‘corrective action’ and ongoing system evolution and adaptation) 
there are implications for infrastructure organisations and their environment.  
By exploring the lifecycle interfaces (which provides a longitudinal profile and also explores 
organisational boundaries in this context), it is clear that strategic intent is not supported from the 
outset.  Directives, objectives, and other statements of intent dissipate or become disconnected by 
strategy development.  This is exacerbated across the project interface and project delivery where 
strategic intent can be adversely affected by project management drivers and ‘best for project’ 
thinking/behaviour.  Then, even if projects are able to fully develop and deliver upon the strategic 
outcomes being sought, there are subsequent milestone or key processes within the lifecycle of that 
infrastructure which inhibit its ability to: 
 Deliver upon the strategic intent; and  
 Fully integrate and transform the system (as was inherently the intent of the capital works in the 
first place). 
Many of the effects or implications of this arise from an insidious issue of omission and unrealised 
potential rather than acts of commission.  Furthermore, many of the negative implications are 
unlikely to be observable within the current conventions of an infrastructure organisation and 
therefore may appear as a ‘latent failure’ to that organisation.  For example: 
  
 Asset life:  In the preliminary research, several ‘legacy’ issues were identified as arising from past 
infrastructure-related decisions and management choices.  However, every example referred to 
infrastructure that was less than a century old and therefore notionally within its design life.  
Examples included operational changes with unintended/unknown consequences (such as might 
be made to a water treatment plant) through to planned/purposeful deferred maintenance that 
knowingly reduces asset life.  Whether purposeful or not, both are ‘active failures’ but may 
become absorbed or latent over time as that system knowledge is lost.   
Study 2 detailed this further, showing a suite of active failures that included (amongst other 
matters) omissions and eroded levels of service.  However, because the loss of asset life may not 
be known, or able to be tracked back to this root cause through organisational processes, a loss 
in asset life becomes a latent effect upon community levels of service (and potentially on rates 
or other levies).  In other words, a latent social, environmental, and/or economic impact.  
Furthermore, all the studies suggest that even if the design life were achieved, the infrastructure 
may not necessarily have fulfilled its potential or delivered the intended benefits. 
 Social exclusion:  Study 3 showed how parts of the community such as certain modes, sectors 
(e.g. rural), or user groups (in particular the vulnerable) are excluded or compromised by 
technical and organisational decision-making and processes.  Furthermore, whilst organisational 
salience and other factors may have led to this, the disparity or absence may not be visible to 
the organisation if those affected do not have a strong community voice to start with (social, 
cultural impact).  This was underscored in study 2 through the apparent lack of clear ownership 
for long-term operational matters, due in part to the diversity operational functions and 
therefore structure. 
 Environmental impacts:  Study 2 showed matters of compliance including environmental 
mitigation and social outcomes were not being incorporated into cOPEX assessments.  Should 
any adverse effects result, then these would not be seen by the subject organisation in this 
instance as there were no internal checks and balances at the time the study was undertaken 
(environment, social, cultural, economic impact).  This was also seen in study 1 with the 
weighting and preference given to traffic related benefits rather than to wider environmental 
and other aspects. 
 System fitness:  The preliminary research interviews highlighted resilience and related factors as 
top of mind for many infrastructure organisations.  Study 2 also highlighted the omission of 
factors that might affect system ‘fitness’ (being aspects such as resilience, adaptive capacity, 
enabling future value).  These will likely only be observable to the organisation in retrospect, 
including after a major event such as a natural disaster (environment, social, cultural, economic 
impact).   
  
Study 1 showed that it was not the strategic intent to exclude any of the above matters, in fact for 
the subject organisation, quite the opposite.  Yet that study showed that in order for long-term 
infrastructure benefits to be realised, more than a project-oriented benefit realisation process is 
required, that this requires the stewardship of our infrastructure systems; the feedback, feed-
forward, and follow through at all levels of the organisation.  Moreover it requires not just the 
delivery of outcomes, but outcomes that are customer-oriented, and enable the goal-seeking 
behaviours of the complex, adaptive system that is infrastructure. 
 Hypothesis:  The strategic intent and the day-to-day management of infrastructure systems are often 
misaligned, with negative consequences for achieving the desired long-term infrastructure system 
outcomes.   
 
Implications for infrastructure administration in practice 
In simple terms this research is applicable at multiple levels and scales, but has the potential to 
enable change to underlying belief-systems and mental models (Figure 6).  This speaks to the nested 
nature of complex systems and that of system aptitude (which is both the attributes and the 
inherent or acquired ability and inclination of the system to respond and adapt to its evolving 
context).  Ultimately, the applicability of the research will depend on the willingness and the ability 
of an organisation/sector/industry to respond to the issues and opportunities that have been raised.  
The research does, however, provide evidence and recommend several interventions to support 
both specific and general change.   
The nature of that change will be context-dependent, and several ‘influencing change’ workshops 
have already started the process within the two study organisations.  However, although change is 
clearly intended, it was not within the scope of this research to either implement that change or to 
monitor its effectiveness.  That is a future opportunity.  But given the complexity of the system, the 
point is that the effects of any change should not be completely discernible/separable, and that by 
effecting any change, the system itself has evolved.   
Also, in challenging from first principles, whilst arguably necessary for purposefully ‘disruptive 
thinking’ (Dobbs et al., 2015), the concepts still needs to be socialised, understood, and that takes 
time.  This is particularly so at the levels of organisational-, sector-, and general infrastructure-
practice considered here.  However, this research contributes to that ‘socialising’ process by 
providing evidence within the detailed studies to raise awareness and develop understanding.  
Readers are referred to the separate papers for that evidence and further detail (see Blom (2014); 
Blom et al. (2015); Blom and Guthrie (2015, 2017a, 2017b)). 
  
ABILITY / WILLINGNESS TO LEARN 
(See Figure 4) 
 
ABILITY / WILLINGNESS TO INFLUENCE 
 
Single-loop:  
Incremental 
improvement.  No 
questioning of 
underlying 
assumptions 
 
Double-loop:  
Revisiting the 
underlying 
assumptions of a 
normative 
framework 
 
Triple-loop:  
Review of 
underlying values, 
belief-systems, and 
mental models 
St
u
d
y 
o
rg
an
is
at
io
n
 
Sector 
W
id
e
r 
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 p
ra
ct
ic
e
 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Technically-
oriented 
improvement 
within the three 
study processes 
Fundamental 
changes to 
processes and 
practice across the 
organisation/sector 
Rewrites 
sector/industry 
approaches/culture 
based on ongoing 
system evolution 
   
Figure 6:  Applicability of this research 
In addition, the research has identified a pressing need for ‘system stewardship’ to address the 
increased specialisation and siloed operation within current practice.  This boundary-spanning 
function and mind-set is needed to not only deliver ‘joined up thinking’, but also organisational 
learning, and the ongoing transformation of the complexed asset-service-organisational-contextual 
system in response to ongoing change.  The other sense-making models described in the detailed 
studies (Blom, 2014; Blom & Guthrie, 2015, 2017a, 2017b) support the function/notion of system 
stewardship and should therefore assist sense-making both within and across the system.  They 
should also assist in orienting practice towards adaptive practice and customer-oriented outcomes.    
Conclusions 
The linear view of infrastructure may have been appropriate in the establishment of ‘new world’ 
economies or in response to specific events such as post-world war or disaster recovery.  However, 
this ‘pipeline’ view of infrastructure does not necessarily assist (as best it might), with managing the 
complexities of less tangible objectives and the messy, non-linear reality of day to day service-led 
infrastructure management.  Edkins and Zerjav (2014) contend the asset-based and service or 
provision-based typologies need to be broadened, and Snowden and Boone (2007) that the 
application of simple solutions or approaches can fail when applied to a complex situation or system.  
  
In short, conventional, linear thinking goes only so far in delivering intended long-term infrastructure 
outcomes.  A new ‘philosophy’ is required, and needs to be both systems-oriented and focused on 
outwardly-looking outcomes.  As such, this requires a move beyond the immediacy of projects and 
programmes (Blom & Guthrie, 2016). 
The benefits of public infrastructure to society is a central theme drawn from the definition of 
infrastructure itself.  This research shows that it is not enough to be focused on technical outcomes.  
Infrastructure needs to move beyond how society interacts with an asset, to the outcomes that 
reflect the needs, beliefs, and choices of society as well as its ability to respond to change (aptitude).  
In short, so that society no longer has to work around its infrastructure.  To this end, the research 
has increased our understanding of the ways in which the misalignment between strategic intent 
and the management of infrastructure systems can occur, and the consequences this has for 
achieving the desired long-term outcomes.  It found those consequences were material, and 
frequently not visible within the sub-system accountable for the delivery of those outcomes.  
However, although the research has confirmed its hypothesis and three supporting propositions, the 
research does not purport to offer ‘the solution’.  Any corrective interventions will not ‘solve’ the 
issues to hand.  This is because single solutions do not exist to address the challenges facing a 
complex adaptive system such as infrastructure.   
There is still considerable scope for further research here.  This includes use of the methodological 
approach, matters of detail arising from the individual detailed studies (e.g. in relation to the vesting 
of assets; detailed studies 2 and 3), and the development of system-level themes.  
Public infrastructure exists, not in its own right, but to benefit society.  It also endures and changes 
in a way that is akin to the metaphorical grandfather’s axe.  As the metaphor goes, the axe has an 
inherent value as an heirloom (even if the axe-head and handle are replaced over time).  For 
infrastructure, this equates to the notion of ‘future value’.  However, in order for our infrastructure 
to be valued in the future, we perhaps need to start thinking of it as ‘our grandchildren’s axe’.  
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